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We simulate a two-sectoral, three-period OLG-model with endogenous fertil- 
ity and endogenous education. Parents receive utility from quantity and quality (education) 
of their offspring, generating a trade-off between the former and the   
latter. Since education governs efficiency in production, hence wage income and growth, 
labour supply and education per child increase and fertility declines dur- 
ing the process of economic development. Therefore, the model is able to explain   
the recent fertility decline, in all developed countries, and to single out the deter-minants 
for long-run growth in per capita terms. The transition speed towards   
the steady state is governed by the growth rate of the wage rate, which in turn   
depends on education investments and fertility of previous generations, leading 
to an intergenerational persistence in these variables. Due to this effect, social 
discrimination in the education sector leads to high fertility and low education in   
the low-income percentiles, while the opposite is true for the upper ones. Hence,   
the average level of education declines and hinders growth. 
JEL: J1, I2, O0 
Keywords: OLG-model, endogenous growth, endogenous fertility, education, in- 
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 1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to put up a framework in which the fall of the fertility rate  
is a transitory and endogenous phenomenon. The intend is to contribute to a better 
understanding of why the total fertility rate has declined in all developed countries and 
what economic policies could influence this demographic process. Specifically, we anal-
yse the transitional dynamics and the equilibrium outcome of the interaction between 
fertility and education in the process of economic growth. 
Traditional growth theory is based on a positive relationship between capital per worker  
k and output per capita y:  f(k) y =  with  0 > (k) f' . The endogenous variables are k 
and per capita consumption whereas fertility n is a given constant. An increase in n  
leads to a decrease in k (an effect called capital dilution) and therefore to a decrease 
in  y a n d  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  o f  c a p i t a l .  I n  m o d e r n  g r o w t h  t h e o r y ,    
the population is partly taken to be constant. The consequence is a so called scale 
effect (big countries grow faster) on which opinions diverge. In approaches labelled   
semi-endogenous, the fertility rate is, again, given and constant. 
The first macroeconomic models with endogenous fertility employed the mircoeconomic 
approach of Becker (1960) in which children show up in their parents’ utility function  
as durable goods. In Barro/Becker (1988, 1989), Becker/Murphy/Tamura (1990) and 
Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995) fertility is endogenized by means of a dynastic utility func-
tion. Whereas Barro/Becker (1988) is partial equilibrium in nature, Becker/Barro   
(1989) and Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995) are one-sectoral macroeconomic models with 
exogenous technological progress in which time and capital costs of child rearing are 
taken into account. However, fertility decisions are consumption oriented in these ap-
proaches, ignoring the investment efforts parents undertake when providing education  
for their children. 
As soon as education is considered, the question as to the relationship between qual- 
ity and quantity of the offspring arises. There are two strands of the literature   
dealing with education in a growth-theroretic framework. The first is pioneered by   
Becker/Murphy/Tamura (1990) who implement the Becker/Lewis (1973) microeco- 
nomic quantity-quality approach into a macroeconomic context. They show that fol-
lowing an exogenous shock which triggers economic development, either all agents have 
positive investment in human capital with a decreasing fertility rate or investment in 
human capital is converging to zero, accompanied by an increasing fertility rate. Intro-
ducing heterogeneity (inequality) into this model would lead to zero income for some 
agents and exploding wealth for others. Kremer/Chen (2000) point out that there is   
  4evidence for a positive correlation between inequality and fertility differentials. Tak- 
ing the quality-quantity-trade-off into account, this correlation must imply education 
differentials as well. In the same line of argument, de la Croix/Doepke (2001) find 
empirical evidence for a growth-harming effect of fertility differentials which are based 
on educational differentials. There, as well as in Dahan/Tsiddon (1999) and Morand 
(1999), inequality is introduced by the initial distribution of human capital. In the   
steady state there is no growth in per capita terms and the distribution of human   
capital is equalized. Hence, there is no scope for redistributional policies. Social dis-
crimination in the education sector is no issue in either of these models. 
The second strand of the literature dealing with the macroeconomic role of educational 
investments of parents in their children follows the human capital approach of Lucas 
(1998). Thus, Glomm (1997) and Glomm/Ravikumar (1992, 1997) trace the human capital 
accumulation back to the parental decision to invest in the education of the   
next generation. Based on their work, Dessy (1998) investigates the relationship be- 
tween fertility decisions and educational regimes on a balanced-growth path. On such  
a path, the population growth rate, the time allocation and the growth rate for human 
capital are all constant.  
The present paper employs a three-period, two-sectroal, OLG framework in the spirit  
of Diamond (1965). Contrary to the above, there is human capital as well as real   
capital accumulation and the analysis encompasses both the equilibrium growth and  
the adjustment process. However, due to the complexity of the model, the transition 
dynamics is simulated. In each period the economy is populated by children, adults   
and old. During childhood each child consumes z units of time out of its parents’ time 
budget and is endowed with education by its parents. In the next period agents par- 
ticipate in the labour market and take all relevant economic decisions: the supply of 
labour, fertility, education of the offspring, consumption and savings. Finally, agents 
retire and consume their savings including accrued interest payments. Similar to Ga- 
lor/Weil (1996), the model generates decreasing fertility due to an increasing wage rate 
during the transition process to a steady state. But whereas their model only consider  
the link between transitory growth and fertility, we endogenize growth, fertility and 
education and can thus show that long-run growth does not cease.  
One of our results is that the level of education of a child depends positively on the  
wage rate of its parents which in turn increases in the wage rate and educational attain-
ment of their parents and so on, leading to an intergenerational persistence in fertility 
decisions, educational efforts and the wage rate. A low wage rate leads to high fertil- 
 
  5ity and low education through generations. In general equilibrium, the allocation of   
labour to the production and the education sector is endogenously determined. The   
education technology depends positively on labour and the level of education of the 
parental generation. Fertility has instead a negative effect on per capita education and 
hence on output in the production sector. The transitional dynamics is characterized   
by an equal increase in capital per worker and in the wage rate, whereby the latter   
equals the product of the growth factors of education and its costs, controlled for the 
variation of the fertility rate. Hence, important for the transition speed is the relation 
between the growth factors of education and fertility. In the steady state all realloca- 
tions in the time budget of the households are closed. Wage rate and capital intensity  
are growing at an equal and constant rate, whilr the fertility rate, the labour supply  
and the factor distribution are constant. The simulations performed show that due to 
increasing wages, labour supply increases, fertility declines and education investments 
per child increase. Productivity in education depends negatively on fertility, hence the 
education sector becomes more productive, resulting in a higher allocation of labour 
to production, compared to earlier stages of development. The other way round, in   
earlier stages labour supply is low and fertility high. To equalize the marginal prod- 
ucts of labour, a relative high amount of this low labour supply has to be allocated to 
education, which is compatible with the altruistic behaviour of the parental generation  
and the source for the wealth of future generations. 
In a next step we consider agents which are heterogeneous in two respects: socially,  
due to different productivities in education and in the abilities to use their educational 
level in the production, hence intellectually. We show that intellectual discriminated 
dynasties have lower wages, lower savings, a higher fertility and lower investments in 
education per child. Furthermore, the convergence speed to the steady state depends 
negatively on the amount of discrimination. Despite the existence of intellectual het-
erogeneities, in the steady state all endogenous variables grow, again, with identical   
and equal rates, whereby the fertility rate is constant and equal for all social classes. 
However, due to different convergence speeds, income and education differences are 
preserved. Because of a higher fertility rate of the lower income percentiles during the 
transition process, redistributional pressure in a median voter system is maintained or 
eventually aggravated, too. This result is contrary to de la Croix/Doepke (2001), Da- 
han/Tsiddon (1999) and Morand (1999). Income transfers slow the convergence speed 
down, leading to higher fertility rates and lower investment in education per child in  
all income classes. 
  6The existence of social discrimination does not only affect the convergence speed, but 
rather the long-run performances, too. Socially discriminated dynasties exhibit lower 
steady state growth rates and higher fertility rates. Here, redistributional pressure is 
maintained as well, but policy interventions in education are growth enhancing. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework with en-
dogenous fertility, but without endogenous education. Section 3 endogenizes education 
and shows up the interactions between education and fertility with its consequences  
for the growth process. Section 4 extends the presented framework for intellectual and 
social heterogeneity, and Section 5 concludes. 
2  Fertility during the Transition to the Steady State 
 
2.1 The  Households 
We consider an economy, which is populated by a continuum of overlapping 
generations. Each generation lives exactly three periods. In the first period, childhood, 
each child consumes a fraction z out of the time budget of its parents. In the second 
period 
of life, adulthood, agents make all their economic relevant decisions. Individuals are 
participating in the labour market and receive a labour income according to their   
offered time quantum. The remaining time is used for childrearing, hence the decision 
between labour supply  t l  and fertility  t n  is made simultaneously. If each household  
is endowed with one unit of time, a representative household faces the time budget 
restriction 
  = + t t l zn 1. (1) 
The labour income  t w (1 ) t zn −  is used for consumption in the current period  t c  and for 
savings  t s . Furthermore, individuals are endowed with a non-labour income V, which  
can be either consumed or saved, too. This leads to the following budget restriction 
  t t t t t s c w zn V w + + = + . (2) 
In the third period, agents retire and consume their savings with accrued interest, so  
that  
  ( ) t t t s   r c 1 1 1 + + + = . (3) 
  7Individuals receive utility from the number of their offspring and current and future 
consumption. People are non-altruistic, so there is no bequest motive. Under a log- 
linear utility function a representative agent, born in period  1 − t , faces in period t the 
following optimization problem 
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subject to (2) and (1), where γ  and ( ) γ − 1  are the weights of the number of children and 
consumption in the utility function, respectively. Future consumption is discounted by  
the individuals rate of time preference  ρ . 
All this leads to optimal solutions 
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The growth rate of consumption between the second and the third period of life depends 
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Obviously, consumption (5) depends positively on its weight in the utility function 
() γ − 1 , on the rate of time preference ρ and on the sum of the wage rate and non- 
labour income ( ) V w
t
t +
−1 . Contrary, saving (7) depends negatively on the rate of time 
preference  , but positively on 
 
ρ ( ) γ − 1 a n d  ( ) V w
t
t +
−1 . The number of children (6) 
depends positively on γ  and  ρ , but negatively on the opportunity costs per child priced 
by the wage rate ( )
1 − t
t zw . 
  82.2 Production 
The aggregated output  t Y  i s  p r o d u c e d  w i t h  l a b o u r   t L  and capital  t K , where  t L  is   
not the number of employees, but the aggregated quantum of labour offered by the 
households, so that 




t t N   zn 1   N l L
1 1 − − − = = . (9) 
Furthermore, production is subject to a linear-homogenous technology of Cobb-Douglas 
type 
  ( ) ( )
α α α α − − − − = =
1 1 1 1   N   zn     BK L BK Y t
t
t t t t t ,   (10) 
which leads to a relation expressing the output per worker 
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Assuming perfect competition on goods and factor markets, factor prices are equal to 
their marginal products 
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The factor prices are a function of capital per employed unit of labour 
t N t l
t K
t k = ~ , so that 
the wage rate depends positively on capital per worker 
t N
t K
t k =  and on the time fraction 
allocated to child-rearing  t zn  e.g. due to an increasing fertility, hence decreasing labour 
supply. On the other hand, a higher wage rate leads according to (6) to a reduction  
of the number of children. Hence with (6) and (12), in a general equilibrium, the 
following relationship holds, which must be unambiguously, due to the monotony of the 
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Equation (14) determines the number of children per household and plays a key role  
for the development of the economy, which will be explored in the following section. 
Unfortunately, solutions for  t n  are not obtainable until exact values for the parameters  
of the model are given. This seems to reduce the generality of the analysis, but one   
has to note, that the qualitative behaviour of the economy is not affected by the   
 
choice of any feasible set of parameter values. A feasible parameter set is such, that   
only economic reasonable values of the endogenous variables are generated, so that   
any variable is an element of R+. In addition, the parameter set must garantie the 
  9convergence to a steady state (growth) path. But, once again, these rquirements have  
to be taken into account for any analytical analysis as well. Hence, we argue without 
further loss of generality under a given parameter constellation. 
2.3  The Dynamics of the Economy 
The stock of capital in the following period  ( ) 1 1 + + t K    t  is given by the sum of savings  
per household of the working generation in the current period t ( ) t
t
t N s  
1 − , hence 
  t
t




+ = .   (15) 
Production in  1 + t  takes place by the then working generation renting capital from   
the retired generation by an interest rate  1 + t r . The number of working households in  
1 t +  equals the number of children in period t, so that  
  t
t
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Substituting for 
1 − t
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Evidently, capital per worker in the future period depends positively on the wage rate 
in the current period, because a higher wage rate increases savings and lowers fertility. 
Furthermore,   increases with the weight of future consumption in the utility func- 
tion 













1  making savings more attractive. Increasing time costs of childrearing z or a 
decreasing weight of children γ lowers fertility and increases  1 + t k . Obviously, the econ-
omy exhibits positive growth  ) 1 1      
t k
t k > +    as long as the wage rate is growing. Because 
of diminishing marginal returns to all production factors capital accumulation leads to 
increasing wage rates, increasing labour supply and decreasing fertility, although with 
 

  10declining rates. Hence, the steady state exhibits zero growth in per-worker terms with  
a constant fertility 
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2.4 Simulation 
As commented in section 2.2 equation (14) can only be solved numerically for given 
parameter values. The solution determines the labour supply and the wage rate in the 
considered period. The latter on its part governs via (18) the value of  1 + t k . Hence,   
the simulation is programmed as a loop, which repeats these process until the system  
is sufficiently close to the steady state.  2 
Parameter:  3 6 0 5 0 5 0 10 75 0 = = = = = = V ; . γ ; . ρ ; . z ; B ; . α  
Initial value:    1 1 = k
t   nt  wt  rt  kt 
t k
~
  yt  t y ~  
1
ˆ
+ t k  
1 1.4052 6.2077 5.5385  1  3.3624  7.3847  24.8310  1.3795 
2 1.3373 7.2871 5.2503 1.3795 4.1638  9.6571  29.1485  1.1738 
3 1.3055 7.9342 5.1035 1.6193 4.6639  11.0193  31.7368  1.0887 
4 1.2893 8.3114 5.0251 1.7631 4.9618  11.8135  33.2456  1.0475 
..  ….. ….. ….. ….. …..  …..  …..  ….. 
37 1.2699 8.8118 4.9281 1.9581 5.3641  12.8670  35.2473  1 
38 1.2699 8.8118 4.9281 1.9581 5.3641  12.8670  35.2473  1 
Table 1: Simulation 
The closed or numerical solutions, given the parameter values and an initial value for  
the first period  , are shown in Table 1. It confirms the above derived implications 
of the model. The wage rate is increasing with the capital stock per worker, leading to  
an increasing labour market participation and a lower fertility rate. The dynamics of   
the economy is plotted in Figure 1. Due to the properties of the production function   
the steady state is globally stable. 
0 1 > k
                                                 
1  represent the change of   in period t compared to the previous period t . The star *  
indicates as usual steady state values. 
t x x 1 −
2 Sufficiently close means here and hence forth constant values from 10-8 on. 

















Figure 1: Dynamics of  1 + t k  in Eq. (18) 
 
2.5 Long-run  Growth  with  Exogenous Technological Progress 
 
The previous section has shown that long-run growth ceases. The present section serves 
to implement exogenous technological progress in the model presented above. To be 
compatible with the properties of a steady state the technological progress has to be 
Harrod-neutral or rather labour augmenting. As a consequence, in the steady state the 
wage rate is increasing with the exogenously given rate of technological progress  . As 
stated in section 2.3 a permanent growth of the wage rate is the necessary condition  
for steady state growth. But, as was established in the previous section, a growing   
wage rate causes a decreasing fertility, thus increasing labour supply. Evidently, this 
situation is not compatible with the properties of an equilibrium, because reallocations  
are not closed. So, there seems to be an immanent contradiction between long-run   
growth caused by a permanent growth of the wage rate and the requirements of an 
equilibrium. Although King, Plosser and Rebello (1988) show, that this contradiction   
can be solved by applying utility functions of the following type 
x
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It is straight forward to show, that the steady state using this type of utility function 
exhibits the following properties: 
•  All variables in per worker terms grow with the rate of technological progress  .  x
•  Labour supply l and fertility n are constant, such that l * l t =  and  * n nt =  
•  Therefore capital per efficient unit of labour 
* ~
t k






 is constant, too. 
Obviously, the log-linear utility function applied in the present context (see Eq. (4)) 
corresponds to the special case with  1 = σ . 
The implementation of labour augmenting technological progress leads to the following 
expressions for the factor prices 
  t r  =  , ~ 1 − α α k B    (20) 
− ~   
1 t
t w  =  () () .   1 1
t x k B + −
α α    (21) 
For the dynamics of the system Eq. (18) still holds, but it is governed by the permanent 
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where for the steady state must hold 
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Due to spill-over effects from the production to the household sector it is assumed,   
that the non-labour income V is growing with the rate of technological progress, too. 
In order to explore the effect(s) of different rates of technological progress on fertility, 
two scenarios are examined,   and  1 . 0 = x 3 . 0 = x  (see Table 2 and 3). 
  13Parameter:  3 ; 6 . 0   ; 5 . 0 ; 5 . 0   ; 10   ; 75 . 0   ; 1 . 0 = = = = = = = V   z B x γ ρ α  
Initial value:    1 1 = k
t   nt  wt  rt  kt  t k   yt  t y ~   1
ˆ
+ t k  t w ˆ  
1  1.4261 6.5303 5.6216  1  3.1681  7.4954  23.7467  1.4511  - 
2  1.3662 8.2089 5.3770 1.4511  3.7851  10.4040 27.1369  1.2570  1.2570 
3  1.3387 9.6664 5.2562 1.8242  4.1450  12.7847 29.0501  1.1775  1.1775 
4  1.3249 11.0194 5.1941  2.1480  4.3471  14.8766  30.1057 1.1399  1.1399 
..  ….. ….. ….. …..  …..  …..  ….. …..  ….. 
35 1.3098  220.3128  5.1240  44.5076  4.5899  304.0763  31.3585  1.1  1.1 
36 1.3098  242.3441  5.1240  48.9584  4.5899  334.4840  31.3585  1.1  1.1 
Table 2: Simulation with  1 . 0 = x  
Parameter:  3   ; 6 . 0   0.5;   ; 5 . 0   ; 10   ; 75 . 0   ; 3 . 0 = = = = = = = V z B x γ ρ α  
Initial value:    1 1 = k
t   nt  wt  rt  kt  t k   yt  t y ~   1
ˆ
+ t k  t w ˆ  
1  1.4633  7.1604  5.7638 1 2.8668  7.6850  22.0320  1.5912  - 
2 1.4183  10.1975  5.5911  1.5912  3.2376  11.8622  24.1363 1.4241 1.4241 
3 1.3984  13.8418  5.5112  2.2661  3.4294  16.6524  25.1012 1.3573 1.3573 
4 1.3891  18.3736  5.4731  3.0759  3.5262  22.4467  25.7325 1.3274 1.3274 
..  ….. ….. …..  …..  ….. …..  …..  …..  ….. 
32 1.380  29059.2557  5.4367 4967.3941 3.6213  36008.8749  26.2516  1.3  1.3 
33 1.380  37777.0324  5.4367 6457.6123 3.6213  46811.5374  26.2516  1.3  1.3 
Table 3: Simulation with  3 . 0 = x  
Once   has converged to its steady state value  , capital per worker k is growing 
with the growth rate of the wage rate, which in turn is growing with the exogenously 
given rate of technological progress  . The technological progress accelerates the con-
vergence speed towards the steady state and leads to a higher fertility in all periods.  
The letter result is quite implausible. Although there are signs indicating a correlation 
between population growth and technological progress in the long-run (Kremer (1993), 
Newton-effect see Jones (1998) or modern growth theory in the line of Grossman and 
Helpman (1995)), the causality applied here is a different. The exogenous technolog- 
ical progress is like an income effect, which weakens the substitution effect caused by  
a growing wage rate. The economy receives the technological progress costlessly and  
the increasing wage rate still raises the opportunity costs of children, but to a lower 
extent.  
t n * n
x
  14In the present context the use of exogenous technological progress seems to be dubious, 
especially if one takes into consideration that technological progress is strongly corre-
lated with investments in human capital. Since the latter are negatively correlated with 
fertility the use of exogenous technological progress does not explain the relationship 
between fertility, human capital investments and the long-run growth performance of  
an economy. In the following section the growth process is endogenized by parental 
investments in education for their children. 
3 Endogenous Growth with Endogenous Fertility 
and Endogenous Education 
Agents are again assumed to be egoistic in that respect sense, that there is no bequest 
motive. Consequently, their wealth is consumed until the end of their third period of  
life. But they are assumed to be altruistic as far as investments in education for their 
offspring are concerned. Education is an accumulateable asset and all past investments  
in education are cumulated in the stock of human capital Ε , where Ε  is used in the pro-
duction sector and in the education sector. Since education improves the efficiency of 
agents in the use of production factors producing Y, the effect of fertility decisions 
on the economy is different to the previous sections. On the one hand fertility is simi- 
lar to consumption and lowers, given the income, savings and hence capital per worker 
(capital dilution), on the other hand fertility has an investment character through ed-
ucation, which enhances efficiency in production, hence weakening the capital dilution 
effect. 
3.1 The  Households 
The costs of fertility are still priced by its opportunity costs zn , but different to the 
previous setup education costs have to be taken into consideration. If   represents   





t n t e =  is the 
education effort undertaken by one household. If further it is assumed, that one unit   
of  t e  costs  t p  units of the consumption good and the representative household chooses to  
have   children he faces in total costs of  t n t t t n e p  for educating his offspring. Evidently, 
because of relative small opportunity costs a relative low wage rate leads to a relative high 
fertility,which in turn causes relative small expenditures for education per child   
and vice versa. In period t, the optimization problem of a representative household 
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 with  β γ > . 
Interesting the relation between the education decisions of parents for their offspring  
(27) and their fertility decisions (28). Higher time costs of childrearing z reduce fer- 
tility   and increase education investments per child  t n t e
1
. The effect of an increase of  
the wage rate works in the same direction. Remarkably, education efforts per child 
depend only on their wage rate  t w  and not on their non-labour income V and there- 
fore implicitly on the education efforts undertaken by their parents and so on. Hence, 
education efforts being the only altruistic element in the presented framework lead by  
its interdependency with the wage rate and fertility decisions to an intergenerational 
persistence in education levels, fertility levels and the wage rate. 
− t
  16From the dependency of the education decisions on the wage rate follow important 
implications for redistributional policies. An increase of income transfers, hence an in-
crease of V, results in an income effect raising fertility, without providing any incentive  
to substitute fertility against education. 
3.2  The Production Sector 
As commented in the introduction in this section, education is assumed to enhance   
the efficiency of the production factors labour and capital, because the individual level 
of education determines the individual abilities in the use of the existing technology. 
Although it has to be taken into account that the educational level of a working agent 
in period t was a control variable of his/her parents in the previous period  1 − t . 
The offered labour quantum  t
t
t t N l
1 L
− =  has to be distributed between production and 
education, hence the fraction of labour employed in the production sector is  t
t
t t N l
1 − φ , 
with  0 1 < < t φ . Consequently, the production function is 









t t ,   (31) 
or in per-workers terms  









t t l Bk e y .   (32) 
3.3  The Education Sector 
Since education is compared to production less capital intensive, it is assumed that the 
education sector produces without capital. Education of the young is undertaken with  
the fraction of labour allocated to this sector () t
t
t t N l   
1 1
− −φ  and the educational level  
of the adult  t
t




− − = . Furthermore, productivity is negatively affected bys the 
average number of children per household, representing a negative quality effect on the 
production side of education. 
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φ , with > 0 A ,   (33) 
where A is a productivity parameter. The young generation inherits the existing aggre-
gated level of human capital   from the adult generation. Because of the altruistic 
behaviour of the latter concerning the educational level per child, a fraction of labour  
is allocated to the education sector, leading to a higher stock of human capital in the  
1 − t Ε
  17aggregate.  3 But more important for further investigations is the development of the 
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Obviously, on the production side the educational level per child 
1 − t
t e  depends positively 






t e , on the amount of labour allocated to this  
sector and also on the productivity parameter A. On the other hand, 
1 − t
t e  depends 
negatively on the current fertility level 
1 − t
t n , because the existing inherited stock of   
human capital and the labour employed in the education sector must be spread over   
more children. 
3.4 General  Equilibrium  Structure and the Dynamics 
In a general equilibrium labour supply and factor distribution between sectors are en-
dogenously determined by the equilibrium goods and factor prices. Hence, the produc-
tion structure and the composition of the output bundle in the economy are completely 
described. At first an equilibrium requires, that the value of the marginal products of 
labour are equalized between the sectors, so that 






















   k  e w
α
α .   (36) 
Using (36), (35) and (27) the fraction of labour employed in the production sector  t u   
can be expressed as a function of labour supply 
1 − t
t l  or rather of fertility 
1 − t






















φ .   (37) 
                                                 
3This behaviour is altruistic, because the amount of labour shifted from production to education 
leads to a decreasing output yt  and decreasing consumption ct in the current period. Only the next   
generation can gain from higher human capital stock. 
  18Due to different properties of the production functions in the two sectors, especially 
decreasing marginal returns to labour in production and constant returns in education,  
a reduction of labour supply e.g. caused by a high fertility leads other things equal to  
a lower fraction of labour allocated to production. 
Substituting  t φ  in (36) by (37) yields with (28) 
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.   (38) 
Similar to Eq. (14) the numerical solution of Eq. (38) determines the number of   
children in a general equilibrium and the static equilibrium values of all endogenous 







t s . 
Hence the economy develops according to 















ρ   β γ
γ β
k .   (39) 
During the transition process towards the steady state, capital per worker and the   
wage rate are growing at the same rate, which equals the growth rate of the value of 





















































































+ = = . 
The economy has reached its steady, if ,contrary to the transition, all reallocations   
in the time budget of the households and of labour between the sectors are closed 
compared to an arbitrarily chosen period  1 − t . Wage rate and capital per worker grow  
not only at an equal rate, but rather at an equal and constant rate. 
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t r r   ,   , l l   , n n = = = =
− − φ φ
1 1   t ∀ . 
According to Eq. (40) the relation between the variation of the value of education to  





 is responsible for the convergence speed towards the steady 
state. 
The simulation shows (see Table 4 ) like one might expect, that the transition process  
is characterized by an increasing wage rate, a decreasing fertility and raising invest- 
ments in education. With a higher level of education per capita individuals are more 
efficient in production. Accompanied by a lower fertility, productivity in the education 
sector is enhanced, which allows for an increase of the fraction of labour employed   
in the production sector ( t φ  increases). Contrary, in low stages of development ( t k  is 
relative small) an equalization of the value of marginal products of labour can only be 
reached by a high employment of labour in education ( t φ  is small). The latter lays the 
foundations for the wealth of future generations enabled by the altruistic behaviour of  
the parental generation. 
  20Parameter Values:    8   ; 3 . 0   ; 6 . 0   ; 5 . 0   ; 35 . 0   ; 8   ; 8   ; 3 . 0 = = = = = = = = V z B A β γ ρ α  
Initial Values:      8 . 0 0   ; 1 . 0 1 = = e k
t   nt  wt  rt  t φ   kt  1 − t e  pt  yt 
1 1.7319  11.6547  0.2062  0.0104  0.1  0.8  3.1539  0.6875 
2  1.6882  20.2864  0.2806  0.0715  0.9064 1.2933 3.3100 0.8481 
3  1.6629  35.2059  0.4187  0.1047  1.5778 2.1450 3.4117 2.2026 
4  1.6310  62.9662  0.6125  0.1448  2.7382 3.6117 3.5544 5.5906 
..  .....  ......  .....  ......  ...... ...... ...... ...... 
62 1.1180 0.6490  10
33  7.3046 0.5867 0.1359  10
32  0.3889 10
23  0.2332 10
10  0.3311 10
33 
63 1.1180 0.2409  10
34  7.3046 0.5867 0.5047  10
32  0.9740 10
23  0.3456 10
10  0.1229 10
34 
 




+ t k  t e ˆ   t p ˆ   t w ˆ  
1 16.6496  24.2150  9.0648  1.6166  -  - 
2  28.9805  30.9751  1.7406 1.6585 1.0494 1.7406 
3  50.2942  36.0274  1.7354 1.6837 1.0307 1.7354 
4  89.9517  44.0577  1.7885 1.7166 1.0418 1.7885 
.. ....  ....  .....  ...…  ....  ..... 
62 0.9271  10
33  0.3807 10
32  3.7118 2.5044 1.4820 3.7118 
63 0.3441  10
34  0.1413 10
33  3.7118 2.5044 1.4820 3.7118 
Table 4: Endogenous Education 
3.5  Parameter Analysis  
This section serves to explore the transitory behaviour of all endogenous variables and  
the change of the steady state solutions, due to partial variations of the parameters,   
compared to the reference scenario in Table 4. Table 5 shows in which direction the 
endogenous variables are affected during the first four periods of the transition process  
to the steady state by a respective change of a parameter. In Table 6 the change of   
the steady state solutions and the convergence time are shown. 
As described in the previous section, the convergence time is governed by the rela- 
tion between   and  1 ˆ ˆ − t te p t n  (see Eq. (40)). Consequently all parameter variations,   
which favour education per child and lower fertility accelerate the transition process  
to the steady state. E.g. a higher preference for fertility 
ˆ
( ) 62 . 0 = γ  leads to a lower   
labour supply and a lower productivity 
t n
A  in the education sector. Under equal initial 
conditions productivity in production is not affected. 
Due to the requirement of factor price equalization between the sectors (see Eq. (36))  
a lower fraction of labour, but of a lower labour supply, is allocated to production ( t φ  
decreases) accompanied by raising education costs ( t p  increases). In the first period   
the wage rate is higher than in the reference scenario, but with a higher preference   
  21 
Changed Parameter  t nt  wt  rt  φ t  kt  1 − t e   pt  yt 
t y ~




+ t k  t e ˆ   t p ˆ   t w ˆ  
V = 6  1  –  –  +  +  =  =  –  +  –  –  +  +     
  2  –  –  +  +  –  +  –  +  –  –  +  +  +  + 
  3  –  –  +  +  –  +  –  +  –  –  +  +  +  + 
  4  –  –  +  +  –  +  –  +  –  –  +  +  +  + 
 
V = 15  1  +  +  –  –  =  =  +  –  +  +  +  –     
  2  +  +  –  –  +  –  +  –  +  +  –  –  –  – 
  3  +  +  –  –  +  –  +  –  +  +  –  –  –  – 
  4  +  +  –  –  +  –  +  –  +  +  –  –  –  – 
 
A = 6  1  +  –  +  +  =  =  +  +  –  –  –  –     
  2  +  –  +  +  –  –  +  –  –  –  –  –  +  – 
  3  +  –  +  +  –  –  +  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
  4  +  –  +  +  –  –  +  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
 
A = 10  1  –  +  –  –  =  =  –  +  +  +  +  +     
  2  –  +  +  –  +  +  –  +  +  +  +  +  –  + 
  3  –  +  +  –  +  +  –  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
  4  –  +  +  –  +  +  –  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
 
B = 6  1  +  –  –  –  =  =  –  –  –  +  –  –     
  2  +  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  +  –  –  –  + 
  3  +  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  +  –  –  –  + 
  4  +  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  +  –  –  –  + 
 
B = 10  1  –  +  +  +  =  =  +  +  +  –  +  +     
  2  –  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  –  +  +  +  + 
  3  –  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  –  +  +  +  + 
  4  –  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  –  +  +  +  + 
Table 5:   Variation of the transitory solutions compared to the reference scenario in 
Table 4 (continuation next page). 
for fertility and a lower productivity in education the educational level of the young 
is lower. In the following period, the latter will affect productivity in education and 
production and agraviate the substitution of education against fertility caused by a   
now lower wage rate. Consequently, the transition process is prolonged. The steady   
state is characterized by a higher fertility and a lower growth rate k . 
* * * ˆ
t t t e p ˆ ˆ 1 = +
Table 6 reveals that there are three groups of parameter variations. The first group, 
changes in the households’ parameters ( ) ρ      z ,   , and β γ , alters the transitory solutions,   
hence the convergence speed and the steady state solutions, most important the long- 
run growth rate of the economy. The second group, changes in the productivity param-
eter in production B and the non-labour income V, only affects the transitory solutions  
and the convergence speed, but do not have any impact on the long-run performance  
of the economy. This is, because variations in B and V only affect the household in- 
come, given the preferences. Consequently, a higher productivity in production raises  
the wage income, leading to higher investments in education for each child and due to  
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+ t k   t e ˆ   t p ˆ   t w ˆ  
γ  = 0.58  1  – – + + = = – + – – + +  
  2  – + + + + + – + + – + + + +
  3  – + + + + + – + + – + + + +
  4  – + + + + + – + + – + + + +
 
γ  = 0.62  1  + + – – = = + – + + –  –   
  2  + – – – – – + – – + –  – – –
  3  + – – – – – + – – + –  – – –
  4  + – – – – – + – – + –  – – –
 
β  = 0.28  1  + – + + = = – + – – –  –   
  2  + – + + – – – + – – –  – + –
  3  +  –  –+– – –––– –   –  –  –
  4  +  –  –+– – –––– –   –  –  –
 
β  = 0.32  1  – + – – = = + – + + + +   
  2  – + – – + + + – + + + + – +
  3  –  +  +–+ + ++++ +  +  +  +
  4  –  +  +–+ + ++++ +  +  +  +
ρ  = 0.4  1  – – + + = = – + – – + +  
  2  – – + + + + – + – – + + + +
  3  – – + + + + – + – – + + + +
  4  – + + + + + – + – – + + + +
 
ρ  = 0.6  1  + + – – = = + – + + –  –   
  2  + + – – – – + – + + –  – – –
  3  + + – – – – + – + + –  – – –
  4  + – – – – – + – – + –  – – –
 
z= 0.33  1  + – + + = = + + – – –  –   
  2  + – – + – – + – – – –  – – –
  3  + – – – – – + – – + –  – – –
  4  + – – – – – + – – – –  – – –
 
z= 0.37  1  – + – – = = – – + + + +   
  2  – + + – + + – + + + + + + +
  3  – + + + + + – + + + + + + +
  4  – + + + + + – + + + + + + +
Table 5: Variation of the transitory solutions compared to the reference scenario in   
Table 4 (continuation from the previous page). 
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Changed Parameter  n
*  * φ   r
*  * ˆ
1 + t k * ˆt e   * ˆt p   t
* 
V = 6  = = === = 61 
V = 15  = = === = 66 
A = 6  = + ––– – 96 
A = 10  = – +++ + 50 
B = 6  = = === = 66 
B = 10  = = === = 59 
γ  = 0.58  – + +++ + 54 
γ  = 0.62  + – ––– – 76 
β  = 0.28  + + ––– – 78 
β  = 0.32  – – +++ + 53 
z = 0.33  + + ––– – 72 
z = 0.37  – – +++ + 56 
ρ  = 0.4  –+– + ++61 
ρ  = 0.6  +–+ – ––64 
Table 6: Variation of the steady state solutions compared to the reference scenario 
 in Table 4.  
higher opportunity costs to a lower fertility. Convergence speed is accelerated and for 
given preference parameters the steady state properties remain unaffected. Interesting, 
a higher non-labour income V leads to a higher transitory fertility and lower transi- 
tory investments in education per child, because the substitution effect caused by the 
raising wage rate during the transition is weakened. Again, the long-run properties of  
the system remain unaffected. Finally, changes in the productivity parameter of the 
education sector A do not have any impact on the steady state fertility n*, because of 
unchanged preference parameters, but on factor distribution and long-run growth rate. 
A higher productivity in education raises the wage income and opportunity costs of 
childrearing. Agents substitute fertility against education during the transition, which 
accelerates the convergence speed. Secondly, in the steady state, education remains to  
be more productive compared to production. The wage rate arbitrage condition (36) 
requires then, that more labour is allocated to education. The long-run growth rate 
 (see Eq. (41)) depends on the accumulation rate of human capital, which   










 has increased. Consequently, policies, which improve productiv- 
ity in education do not harm long-run fertility, but lead to a faster decline of fertility 
during the transition. Further more long-run growth is improved. 
  244 Heterogeneous  Agents 
The analysis in the previous section has revealed that the wage rate plays a crucial   
role for the dynamics of the economy. Therefore income heterogeneity seems to be   
of significant importance both for the transition process and for the long-run growth 
performance of the economy. In the present context two sources of heterogeneity are 
considered. Firstly, distinct intellectual ability to use the acquired level of education   
in production and secondly, social discrimination due to different productivity levels  
in the education sector. 
4.1 Intellectual  Heterogeneity 
In the line of Loury (1981) and Benabou (1996) intellectual heterogeneity is modelled 
through an identical and independent distributed shock   with a normalized mean, so 
that  
i ε
  E[] ε 1 = .   (42) 
Since we make a distinction between intellectual and social heterogeneity,   does not 
represent the general access to human capital, but rather the ability to use the ac- 
quired human capital in production (e.g. other things equal, a more intelligent agent 
generates a higher degree of effectiveness with a high school degree in production than 
his classmates). Hence, the following expression has to hold for an arbitrarily chosen 







t 1 − ε ( )
α φ
α − − −
−
1 1 2








t .   (43) 
If two individuals with distinct abilities are considered, e.g.  <
i ε
j ε 4 and if further it 
is assumed, that these abilities are of genetic nature and therefore hereditary, dynasty  
of type i is during the transition process characterized by a lower wage rate, a higher 
fertility, lower education efforts and lower savings, compared to dynasty j. Because of  
Eq. (40) it must be true , that 








t w k w k ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 = < = + +
Therefore dynasty j converges with a higher speed to the steady state equilibrium, 
accompanied by a lower fertility and higher education efforts. If all dynasties have 
reached the steady state growth path, fertility is constant and equal for all dynasties  
and all variables grow at equal and constant rates (see Eq. (41)) 
                                                 
4Setting   and   leads to an equivalent scenario shown in Table 5 and 6 with  75 . 0 =
i ε 25 . 1 =
j ε 8 = B   
and  . Therefore a particular simulation for this scenario is omitted here.  10 = B









t w k w k = = = + +
* * j * i n n n = =
Although intellectual heterogeneity has no long-run impact on growth rates and fertil- 
ity, two points have to be taken into consideration. Firstly, due to different convergence 
speeds, differences in the income levels between dynasties are maintained and secondly, 
owing to a higher fertility of the lower income dynasties redistributional pressure and 
power has increased during the transition process and is maintained in the steady state. 
Consequently, the median voter will opt for income transfers lowering labour income in 
the upper income percentiles and raising non-labour income in the lower income per-
centiles. Thus, fertility raises in all income percentiles, but investments in education 
declines. The former is true, because of lower opportunity costs of child-rearing in the 
upper percentiles and higher household incomes in the lower ones (see Eq. (28)). Due  
to lower opportunity costs the taxed percentiles substitute education against fertility, 
whereas the lower percentiles are characterized by constant opportunity costs, but a 
higher non-labour income, which raises fertility accompanied by equal expenditures in 
education per child (see Eq. (27)). As a consequence policies like family allowances   
raise fertility, but are harmful for growth, since no incentive is provided to expand ed-
ucation per child (e.g. family allowances accompanied by education policies improving 
productivity in education). 
4.2 Social  Heterogeneity 
The second source of heterogeneity in the economy is social discrimination in the 
education sector. To simplify matters, the society is assumed to be stratified into   
three classes (lower, middle and upper class) and discrimination works through the 
productivity parameter of the education sector A (e.g. due to different expenditures   
of the local community for school equipment), so that  
 
up mid low A A A < < .   (46) 
Taking into account the simulation results in Table 5 and 6 (setting   
and  ), social heterogeneity does not only affect the transitory behaviour, but 
rather the long-run performance of the economy as well. Each of these three social   
classes converges to a different steady state, whereas, due to a higher fertility the   
 
8   , 6 = =
mid low A A
10 =
up A
  26overall growth rate of the economy is limited by  . 
low A
In a regime with coexistence of intellectual and social heterogeneity the redistributional 
pressure with its growth harming effects is aggravated. The policy implications are the 
same. Income transfers from rich to poor would speed up fertility, but at the cost of  
a lower growth rate. Therefore the necessity of educational policy interventions has 
increased. This would eventually harm per capita growth in the upper classes, but   
enhance the overall long-run growth rate of the economy. 
5 Concluding  Remarks 
In the present paper, we have shown that education of a child depends positively on  
the wage rate of its parents, which in turn depends positively on the wage rate and 
educational attainments of their parents and so on, leading to an intergenerational 
persistence in fertility decisions, educational efforts and wage rates. Contrary, a low   
wage rate leads to a high fertility and low education through the generations. 
The transitional dynamics is characterized by an equal increase in capital intensity   
and wage rate, which depends positively on the relation between the variation of ed-
ucation and fertility. In the steady state wage rate and capital intensity are growing   
at an equal and constant rate, whereas fertility, labour supply and factor distribution 
between production and education are constant. 
Because of the falling fertility rate during the transition process education and produc- 
tion becomes more productive, resulting in a higher allocation of labour to production, 
compared to earlier stages a development. Hence, a relative low allocation of labour  
to proction in earlier stage of development is the source of the wealth for future 
generations.  
Intellectual heterogeneity has no long-run impact as long as there is no income trans- 
fer system implemented, but due to higher fertility rates in lower income percentiles, 
during the transition redistributional pressure increases. 
Social dicrimination in the education sector however harm transitory and long-run 
growth. Income transfers speed up fertility and lower education efforts, resulting in a 
lower growth rate. Therefore in both scenarios (as well as in a regime with coexistence  
of intellectual and social heterogeneity) family allowances should be accompanied by 
educational policies. 
Moreover, heterogeneity offers the possibility to endogenize the median voter system 
within a dynamical setting. 
  27References 
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995), Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill, New 
 York. 
Becker, G. S. (1960), An Economic Analysis of Fertility, in Ansley J. Coale, ed., 
  Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries, Princeton Univer- 
 sity  Press, Princeton, NJ, 209-240. 
Becker, G. S. and Lewis, H. G. (1973), On the Interaction Between Quantity and   
  Quality of Children, Journal of Political Economiy, Vol. 82, 279-288. 
Becker, G. S. and Barro, R. J. (1988), A Reformulation of the Economic Theory 
 of  Fertility,  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103(2), 1-26. 
Becker, G. S. and Barro, R. J. (1989), Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic   
 Growth,  Econometrica, Vol. 57(2), 481-501. 
Becker, G. S., Barro, R. J. and Tamura, R. (1990), Human Capital, Fertility, 
  and Economic Growth, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98(5), 12-37. 
Benabou, R. (1996), Inequaltiy and Growth, NBER, Working Paper 5658. 
Croix de la, D. and Doepke, M (2001), Inequality and Growth: Why Differen- 
 tial  Fertility  Matters,  mimeo, UCLA, Los Angeles. 
Dahan, M. and Tsiddon, D. (1998), Demographic Trasition, Income Distribution 
  and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 3, 29-52. 
Dessy, S. E. (1998), Education Subsidy, Fertility, and Growth, mimeo, University 
  of Laval, Quebec, Kanada. 
Diamond, P. A. (1965), National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 55, 1126-1150. 
Galor, O. and Weil, D. N. (1996), The Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth, The  
American Economic Review, Vol. 86(3), 374-387. 
Glomm, G. (1997), Parental Choice of Human Capital Investment, Journal of De-velopment 
Economics, Vol. 53, 99-114. 
 
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B. (1992), Public versus Private Investment in Hu- 
man Capital: Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 100(4), 818-834. 
  28Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B. (1997), Productive Government Expenditures and   
Long-run Growth, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 21, 183-204. 
Grossmann, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1995), Innovation and Growth, MIT Press,  
Cambridge (MA). 
Jones, I. J. (1998), Population and Ideas: A Theory of Endogenous Growth, mimeo, 
Standford University. 
King, R. G., Plosser, C. I. and Rebello, S. T. (1988), Production, Growth and   
Business Cycles: I. The Basic Neoclassical Model, Journal of Monetary Eco- 
nomics, Vol. 21, 195-323. 
Kremer, M. (1993), Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million 
B.C. to 1990, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 681-716. 
Kremer, M. and Chen, D. (2000), I n c o m e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  D y n a m i c s  w i t h  E n d o g e -  
nous Fertilty, NBER, Working Paper 7530. 
Loury, G. C. (1981), Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings, 
Econometrica, Vol. 49, pp. 843-867. 
Lucas Jr., R. E. (1988), On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of Monetary 
Economic, Vol.22, pp. 3-42. 
Morand, O. F. (1999), Endogenous Fertility, Income Distribution, and Growth, Jour- 
nal of Economic Growth, Vol. 4, 331-349. 
  29List of Notation 
Yt:  aggregate output in period t 
A:  productivity parameter in the education sector 
B:  productivity parameter in the production sector 
Nt:  number of adult households in period t 
Lt:  aggregate labour supply in period t 
Kt:  aggregate stock of physical capital in period t 
Et:  aggregate stock of human capital in period t 
yt:  output per adult household in period t 
kt:  capital intensity in period t 
et:  education per child in period t 
pt:  price per unit education in units of the consumption good 
wt:  wage rate in period t 
xt:  exogenous rate of (labour-augmenting) technological progress 
V: non-labour  income 
rt:  interest rate in period t 
nt:  fertility (number of children) per household in period t 
lt:  labour supply per adult household in period t 
   t φ :  fraction of labour allocated to production 
z:  time costs per child 
ct:  consumption per adult household in period t 
st:  savings per adult household in period t 
ut:  utility per adult household in period t 
α :  income share of physical capital  
β :  weight of education per child in the utility function 
ε : ability  shock 
γ :  weight of the offspring in the utility function 
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